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Abstract
We analyze the duration of the patent examination process at the Euro-
pean Patent Office (EPO). Our data contain information related to the patent’s
economic and technical relevance, EPO capacity and workload as well as novel
citation measures which are derived from the EPO’s search reports. In our multi-
variate analysis we estimate competing risk specifications in order to characterize
differences in the processes leading to a withdrawal of the application by the ap-
plicant, a refusal of the patent grant by the examiner or an actual patent grant.
Highly cited applications are approved faster by the EPO than less important
ones, but they are also withdrawn less quickly by the applicant. The process
duration increases for all outcomes with the application’s complexity, original-
ity, number of references (backward citations) in the search report and with the
EPO’s workload at the filing date. Endogenous applicant behavior becomes ap-
parent in other results: more controversial claims lead to slower grants, but faster
withdrawals, while relatively well-documented applications (identified by a high
share of applicant references appearing in the search report) are approved faster
and take longer to be withdrawn.
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1 Introduction
The design of patent systems has recently become a major concern to public policy
decision-makers. A number of prominent policy panels in the U.S. have recently studied
the US patent system and have issued recommendations for patent examination and
related issues.1 One major question in this debate concerns the timing of and level
of scrutiny employed in patent examination processes.2 While patent systems are to
some degree idiosyncratic due to the territorial nature of patent rights, important
insights can nonetheless be learned from analyzing examination processes in different
institutional and legal settings. Our study seeks to contribute to the current debate by
providing a detailed analysis of the duration of examination processes at the European
Patent Office (EPO). Together with the USPTO (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office)
and JPO (Japanese Patent Office), the EPO belongs to the three largest patent offices
worldwide. More than half of the applicants at the EPO come from non-European
countries.3 A study of EPO practices is therefore not only of relevance to scholars
interested in patent system design in general, but also to European and non-European
policy-makers and users of the EPO system.
In this paper, we seek to identify the major determinants of the duration of EPO
decision-making processes. We consider three broad groups of factors that influence
pendencies: the patent office’s capacity and backlog of pending applications which
reflect the workload relative to existing capacity; the complexity of the examination
task at hand, including measures of the application’s quality; and factors that may
lead to de- or acceleration for strategic reasons.
The last two decades have seen a strong increase in patent applications at the EPO.
Figure 1 shows the number of applications and grants filed at the EPO. The figure
distinguishes between PCT (Patent Cooperation Treaty) applications and applications
filed directly at the EPO. While the increasing demand for patent protection provides
an important source of variation for our study, the figure also demonstrates that our
analysis addresses an urgent policy need, as the EPO situation is typical for all major
patent offices which are nowadays confronted with the question of how to find the right
balance between precision of examination and the duration of patent examination.4
Given a certain level of demand for patent examination and a constant-quality
policy as propagated at the EPO, one of the most obvious determinants of the duration
1See Federal Trade Commission (2003) and National Research Council (2004).
2See Lemley (2001), Cockburn et al. (2003) and Re´gibeau & Rockett (2003).
3See European Patent Office (2003, 22, Fig. 6).
4Examination at the USPTO and the EPO appear to follow very different philosophies with regard
to application pendencies. The USPTO appears to view itself as a service agency with the mission of
allowing patent applicants to obtain their patent rights as early as possible (Lemley 2001). The EPO,
while also acknowledging its obligations towards its users and customers, in particular the group of
patent applicants, insists that it needs to maintain high quality in patent examination. See European
Patent Office (2005, pp.6-8)
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of patent examination is the office’s examination capacity. In the absence of adjustment
costs, examination capacity should not play any role for the duration of examination
processes. But typically, patent offices will not be able to adjust their search and
examination capacities at short notice. For example, examiners in some mechanical
field cannot be retrained quickly to examine patents in mobile telephony.5 Moreover,
experienced patent examiners cannot be hired quickly in the labor market either, since
patent examiners typically have to undergo a training period of several years to become
fully productive in a given technical field. Unanticipated growth in the demand for
patent examination in a particular technical field is therefore likely to lead to increases
in decision lags.6 Clearly, within any longitudinal study of decision-making at the
patent office, changes in the demand for patent examinations as well as examination
capacity of the office should be taken into account. We do so by computing a measure
of pending examination cases per examiner at the EPO. We date this information to
the filing date of our patents.
A second major determinant of the duration of examination processes is the com-
plexity and comprehensiveness of the individual examination task as well as the quality
of the patent examination. We use the number of claims and various citation-based
measures to operationalize the complexity of the patent examination task and the qual-
ity of the patent application. Our data reveal that over time the number of claims and
the number of references to earlier patents and to non-patent literature have been in-
creasing considerably. As to quality differences, we consider an application to have high
quality if relatively many of its claims refer to novel elements in the invention and have
high inventive step (non-obviousness), or if the applicant has written the application in
a transparent way. Obviously, higher application quality would reduce the examiner’s
efforts, ceteris paribus. A high-quality application is likely to be approved faster by
the examiner as quality of the application reduces the examiner’s effort.7 The quality
measures used in the paper are again derived from citations in the EPO search reports.
Our citation measures are particular informative since they make use of a classification
scheme employed in EPO (and WIPO) search reports which indicates if the novelty
and inventive step of claims in the application are affected by prior art. Taking these
measures into account increases the fit of our models considerably.
We also include institutional indicators as third group of major determinants of the
duration of EPO examination processes. Institutional heterogeneity is a consequence
of the increasing use of PCT applications which require a somewhat different treatment
than applications filed directly at the EPO (Euro-direct applications). In particular,
5Shortages in examiners in this area were apparently responsible in the late 1990s for increased
pendencies at the EPO. See European Patent Office (1999, p. 26).
6The term ’lag’ is used here as a neutral description and thus synonymous with the term ’duration’.
7We note in the paper that quality in itself is endogenous and that high quality will signal that
the applicant is considering the effort of investing in application quality worthwhile - in other words,
patent quality is likely to be associated with private patent value as well (see below).
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PCT filings give applicants a longer time period to make decisions about important
features of the actual application process, such as the countries for which patent pro-
tection is actually sought. Applicants also have more leeway to modify PCT filings
than patents submitted directly to the EPO. Such modifications in the characteristics
of patent applications pose an additional challenge to patent office personnel.
We also seek to answer the question if more important and valuable patents typically
have longer pendencies than less important ones. The impact of patent value on dura-
tions is a complicated issue that has not been discussed properly in previous work. It is
important to note that the relationship does not come about as a consequence of a con-
scious efforts on behalf of the examiner to treat potentially valuable patents differently
from less valuable ones. The EPO’s Guidelines for Substantive Patent Examination
explicitly preclude examiners from taking economic considerations such as the value of
the patent into account when performing the examination.8 Rather, the relationship
between value and pendencies stems from two other sources. First, the characteristics
discussed before may have a systematic statistical association with value. For exam-
ple, if broad patents are particularly valuable, but difficult to evaluate, there will be a
positive relationship between value and duration. Even if we control for the number
of claims, value may be correlated with unobserved aspects of patent complexity. Sec-
ond, the relationship is complicated by the fact that the duration of examination is not
just a function of examiner behavior, it is also affected endogenously by the applicant.
The owner of a potentially valuable patent will be willing to spend considerable time
and effort in the negotiation process with the examiner if the grant is at risk. Thus,
we expect that the withdrawal of a potentially valuable application will tend to occur
relatively late. Conversely, if the examiner is willing to grant the patent, the owner is
presumably willing to accelerate the communication process. Following earlier studies,
we use citation measures to approximate the private value of patent rights. We also
argue that requests for accelerated examination indicate value and employ a dummy
variable to capture this information.
There is controversy in the literature as to whether important patents are approved
faster or slower than less important ones. Popp et al. (2003) argue that this is the
case for USPTO-granted patents, while Re´gibeau & Rockett (2003) come to a differ-
ent conclusion.9 None of these studies can take selection effects into account since
prior to the year 2000, all USPTO applications which did not lead to a patent grant
remained secret. Therefore, in U.S. patent data, the population of applications filed
at the patent office is unknown.10 Hence, these studies are not able to control for the
8See http://www.european-patent-office.org/legal/gui_lines/e/c.htm for an online ver-
sion of the guidelines. Latest visit March 26, 2006.
9Popp et al. (2003) analyze the duration of patent examination at the USPTO using a large data
set across technical fields and application years. Re´gibeau & Rockett (2003) concentrate on patents
covering genetically modified plants. For these patents, the authors have in-depth information on the
patents’ importance, scope and other characteristics.
10Since March, 29th, 2000, the USPTO is publishing patent applications under the eighteen-month
4
differential impact of patent characteristics on the competing durations of withdrawals,
refusals and grants of patent applications. Our study explicitly estimates the duration
of the processes leading to these different outcomes. A competing risk model of the
durations is employed to account both for selection and heterogeneous effects of patent
characteristics as well as other determinants on the competing outcomes. To the best
of our knowledge, ours is the first study to do so.
To summarize our results, we find that the estimated hazard functions differ signif-
icantly across outcomes. We find that some of the coefficients reverse their signs across
outcome equations in accordance with our expectations. Highly cited applications are
approved faster by the EPO than less important ones, but they are also withdrawn less
quickly by the applicant. The process durations increase for all outcomes with the appli-
cation’s complexity, number of references (backward citations) in the search report and
with the EPO’s workload at the filing date. Endogenous applicant behavior becomes
apparent in several of our results: more controversial claims lead to slower grants, but
faster withdrawals, while relatively well-documented applications (identified by a high
share of applicant references appearing in the search report) are approved faster and
take longer to be withdrawn. We use these results to discuss various implications for
the design of fee structures and patent office capacity planning.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 of the paper the insti-
tutional background of the patent examination processes at the European Patent Office
is set out in broad terms. Section 3 develops a qualitative notion of the determinants of
the decision-making lags at the EPO. We start with a discussion of normative aspects
which is complemented by a discussion of private incentives of patent applicants to de-
lay or accelerate examination, and of the impact of legal rules at the EPO. In section
4, the data set used for the analysis is briefly described. It represents a random sample
of all EPO applications filed from the start of EPO’s operation on June 1st, 1978 to
July 25th, 2003. Further, the variables constructed from the raw data are discussed. In
section 5, a descriptive analysis of the duration data is provided before competing risk
hazard rate models are estimated. In the multivariate analysis, we model the process
durations relying on Cox’s Proportional Hazard model. Section 6 concludes and states
implications of the findings for future research and the current debate on patent policy.
publication provisions of the American Inventors Protection Act of 1999 (AIPA). Applicants who only
seek protection for their invention at the USPTO, but not in other jurisdictions, can be exempted from
publication. Patent applications filed before that date are only published if they led to a patent grant
and remain secret otherwise. See http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/olia/aipa/index.
htm, latest visit March, 24th, 2005.
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2 Institutional Background: Patent Applications
at the European Patent Office
The EPO offers a harmonized application and examination path for applicants seeking
patent protection in signatory states to the European Patent Convention (EPC). In an
EPO application, the applicant designates the EPC member states for which patent
protection is requested. To obtain patent protection in any of the EPC countries,
applicants could alternatively seek to obtain patent grants directly from the respective
national patent offices. However, the EPO application path is typically preferred over
the individual national paths once the applicant seeks protection in more than three
EPC countries, since the total cost of a European patent amounts to approximately
EUR 29,800, roughly three times as much as a typical national application.11
Figure 2 provides a highly simplified presentation of the examination process of
patent applications at the EPO. Once an EPO application has been filed, a search re-
port is generated by the The Hague office of the EPO.12 The search report describes the
state of prior art regarded as relevant according to EPO guidelines for the patentability
of the invention, i.e., it contains a list of references to prior patents and/or non-patent
sources. Unlike in the U.S. system, applicants at the EPO are not required to supply
a full list of prior art (see Michael & Bettels 2001, p. 191 and Meyer 2000b, p. 109).
The search report is made public by the EPO typically with the publication of the
application which takes place eighteen months after the priority date of the patent
application (see Figure 2).13
Within 6 months after the announcement of the publication of the search report
in the EP Bulletin, applicants may request the examination of their application.14 If
examination is not requested (which may be the case if the search report reveals consid-
erable prior art that would make a patent grant seem unlikely), the patent application
is deemed to be withdrawn according to Art. 94(3) EPC. The patent application may
also be withdrawn explicitly. A withdrawal (explicit or implicit) of the application is
one potential outcome of the application procedure.
In the actual examination process, the examiner determines whether the patent
application has merit according to the patentability criteria at the EPO: novelty, in-
11See EPO notes on ’Cost of an average European patent as at 1.7.99 ’, http://www.
european-patent-office.org/epo/new/kosten_e.pdf, latest visit October, 11th, 2006.
12The EPO has recently initiated a major change in its search and examination processes. Under
the heading BEST – Bringing Examination and Search Together both processes are executed by one
searcher/examiner (http://www.european-patent-office.org/epo/president/e/2003_05_08_e.
htm, latest visit March, 16th, 2005). For the bulk of the data used in this paper, BEST was not used
and search and examination were executed by at least two individuals separately.
13Note that the date of publication is often only six months after the application at the EPO, since
many applicants choose to first file their application at one of the national offices before deciding to
enter the European application path. They may do so within the priority year, so that the EPO
publication frequently appears about six months after the application has been filed at the EPO.
14See Art. 94(2) EPC.
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ventive step and industrial applicability. After an examination has been performed,
the EPO either informs the applicant that the patent will be granted as specified in
the original application or requires the applicant to agree to changes in the applica-
tion. Once an agreement has been found between the applicant and the examiner,
the patent is granted by the EPO. The applicant may then take the EPO decision
to the national patent offices where the patent is issued for the respective designated
state and is translated into the relevant national language.15 During the examination
process, the applicant may decide not to pursue the patenting effort since the prospect
of actually obtaining a valuable patent may be weak. This outcome (withdrawal) is
again reflected in the data. The EPO may decline to grant a patent as requested by
the applicant. This refusal to grant is another potential outcome of the application
process. The most frequent outcome with about two thirds of the cases is an actual
patent grant. In rare cases, the patenting process is terminated because an independent
inventor has deceased and the heirs do not pursue the application. In other cases, it is
decided to merge the patent application with another one that was initially submitted.
These cases account for less than 0.1 percent of all applications and we treat them as
withdrawals.
Applications filed under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) require particular
attention, since they now constitute a large share of all filings at the EPO and are
subject to specific institutional treatments (see Figure 1). Strictly speaking, a PCT
filing is not a patent application, but grants the filing party the option to launch patent
applications in up to 13316 PCT signatory countries within 30 months of the filing date
(which becomes the priority date). Any patent application already filed can be turned
into a PCT filing within the priority year. Figure 3 contains a simplified presentation
of the PCT application path. PCT filings are advantageous for several reasons. First,
they allow the expansion of patent protection to a large number of countries without
incurring the full costs and complexity of national application paths. Second, appli-
cants will receive an international search report within a relatively short time period,
informing them about prior art that may be relevant for the own application’s likeli-
hood of being granted. The search report is generated and published by one of seven
ISAs (International Search Authorities) 18 months after the priority filing of the appli-
cation (see Figure 3). Third, the PCT filing, when compared to a national or regional
application17, has greater option value, since it allows applicants to delay the choice of
countries for which they designate the application for up to 30 months after the priority
date. Costly decisions can thus be deferred for 30 months (and not just for the duration
15The issuing of EPO-granted patents by the national offices is referred to as validation.
16As of October, 2006 (see http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?country_
id=ALL&start_year=ANY&end_year=ANY&search_what=C&treaty_id=6, latest visit October, 11th,
2006).
17National applications are filed at the respective national patent office. The term ’regional appli-
cation’ refers to filings at the EPO which is the granting authority for countries that have signed the
European Patent Convention (EPC).
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of the priority year, as with national and regional applications). PCT filings can also
receive a preliminary international examination which is authoritive, but not binding
for the national or regional offices finally examining the patent. Applicants have to file
the demand for the international examination within 4 months after the publication of
the search report. The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) also claims
that ”(. . .) any patents subsequently granted by the national or regional Offices on the
international application can be relied on by the applicant to a greater extent than
would have been the case without the benefit of the international search report and
the international preliminary examination report” implying a greater legal certainty
for PCT applications than for other applications (World Intellectual Property Orga-
nization 2002). Finally, PCT applications are not subject to certain cost rules, e.g.
claims fees as they exist at the EPO and the USPTO.
3 Theoretical Background and Hypotheses
In this section, we briefly describe potential determinants of the decision-making lags in
EPO examinations and develop our hypotheses. We start by considering the relatively
sparse theoretical literature and previous empirical studies in this field.
3.1 Previous Studies and Normative Issues
Many theoretical models in the industrial organization literature use the assumption of
perfect or imperfect patent protection. This assumption allows researchers to come to
a convenient and tractable post-invention market structure. For example, the classical
patent race models developed by Loury (1979) or Lee & Wilde (1980) assume that a
patent entitles the winner of the R&D race to full patent protection which is equiv-
alent to some prize, while the losers will receive nothing (winner-takes-all). In some
models (see, e.g., De Fraja 1993), the winner-takes-all assumption is relaxed in order
to accommodate more realistic conditions under which even the second-in-place can
earn some prize.18 But irrespective of what is assumed in the industrial organization
literature about the extent or potency of patent protection, the assumption that the
patent unfolds its efficacy immediately has not been subject to a detailed and differ-
entiated analysis. Moreover, the stochastic nature of the patent examination process
is usually not taken into account.19 Yet, the fact that applicants are facing a process
with unknown duration and unknown outcome is likely to have some impact on their
actual behavior. The anticipated behavior of the patent examiner even has direct im-
18For a more detailed survey of the literature see Tirole (1989, ch. 10) or Bester (2004, ch. 5).
19An important exception is the study by Lemley & Shapiro (2005) highlighting that ’a patent does
not confer upon its owner the right to exclude but rather a try to exclude by asserting the patent in
court’. In addition to the effect of uncertainty about the commercial significance the authors analyze
the effect of uncertainty about the validity and scope of legal protection on the incentives to enforce
and to litigate a patent.
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plications on the way in which patent applications are drafted by patent attorneys.
This is pointed out in a qualitative study of patenting behavior by Harhoff & Reitzig
(2001).
A formal model of all trade-offs involved in determining the socially optimal du-
ration of patent examination would be beyond the scope of this paper. However,
important aspects of these trade-offs have been analyzed in recent work by Re´gibeau
& Rockett (2003). They develop and apply a model to patent data covering subject
matter related to genetically modified food. Re´gibeau & Rockett (2003) examine the
relationship between the length of patent examination and the importance of inventions
and specify a simple model of the patent approval process. A key feature of the model
is that patent granting decisions are imperfect, but their precision can be improved
by delaying the examination of the applications, as more information arrives costlessly
over time. Hence longer approval delays make for better decisions.
In the model of Re´gibeau & Rockett (2003) firms can engage either in costless non-
innovative projects or in costly innovative projects. They can apply for patent protec-
tion irrespective of the type of project pursued. Moreover, non-innovative as well as
innovative projects are only profitable for the firms if patent protection is obtained.
Since patent approvals are assumed to be imperfect, patents on non-innovative projects
are granted with a certain probability which is negatively related to the duration of ex-
amination. Erroneous patent grants on non-innovative activities reduce social welfare.
On the other hand, innovative projects are welfare enhancing irrespective whether the
undertaking firm receives patent protection or not.
In this setting firms will engage in innovative (and welfare enhancing) activities only
if the expected profits from innovations exceed their opportunity cost, i.e., the sum of
the cost of innovation plus expected benefits from erroneously patented non-innovative
activity. The model shows that an increase in the duration of patent examination
increases social welfare since it lowers the probability of erroneously granted patents
on non-innovative activity. This decreases the expected value of this kind of project and
increases the incentive to engage in innovative activity. At the same time, increasing
examination durations decrease the private value of innovative projects (which is also
dependent on the importance of the underlying invention) since profits are realized
only after the patent has been granted and have therefore to be discounted for a longer
period of time.
Relying on this trade-off, Re´gibeau & Rockett (2003) find that controlling for a
patent’s position in the technology cycle, the optimal patent examination time de-
creases with the importance of the invention to be protected. Hence, one of the main
findings from this model is that it is welfare enhancing if important patents are granted
faster.
While the model of Re´gibeau & Rockett (2003) contains a comprehensive discussion
of the trade-offs involved in determining an optimal approval delay, it does not cover
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some aspects which we consider important. These turn on the tradeoff between ex
post litigation costs and ex ante dilutions of incentives due to delayed examination. In
this context, one can ask which arguments would favor a very quick examination of
patent rights (in the extreme case a mere registration system) versus a view in which
it is advantageous to let some time pass in order to subject the patent to a thorough
review, particularly in the light of new information that arrives some time after the
application has been filed. The first argument that speaks in favor of (relatively)
thorough examination of patents is that this process is presumably less costly – socially
and privately – than litigation of patents. According to this view, patents serve to signal
to patent holders and possible rivals an ex ante assessment of the actual distribution
of rights that would be maintained even after litigation has taken place. The more
’robust’ a patent is in the legal sense, the less necessity for litigation will exist. With
a mere registration system, on the other hand, a large number of court decisions have
to be expected that will actually declare void a large number of patent rights. Hence,
registration systems will – in this regard – provide less certainty for investors than
examination systems.
At the same time, this argument helps to understand that a very long examination
period may also be counterproductive. Typically, patent applicants have – during
the examination period – only limited protection against infringement. In most legal
systems, patent owners are not entitled to full damages during the examination phase.
Hence, the longer the examination period, the more precise the delineation of the patent
right becomes; conversely, the weaker will be investment incentives due to the weak
legal position the patent holder has. While this constitutes a positive ex post effect on
welfare since there is more competition in product markets, ex ante research incentives
will suffer.
A second argument in favor of extending the period of examination (at the margin)
is that the quality of the patent office’s decision-making is likely to improve over time
due to new information becoming available.20 As new scientific and technological infor-
mation arrives, examiners will be able to determine more precisely the optimal scope
and breadth of the patent when it issues. Granting too broad a patent will harm ex
post welfare by creating too much market power, systematically granting too narrow a
patent would harm ex ante research incentives.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to determine the optimal tradeoff between the
precision of patent examination on the one hand and its duration on the other. Yet, the
question will become more important as policy-makers have discovered the issue and
argue for a reduction of grant lags. In the U.S., the recent growth in demand for patent
protection has led to some increase in the duration of examination.21 At the same time,
20This argument is already taken into account by Re´gibeau & Rockett (2003).
21Popp et al. (2003, Figure 4) show that the grant lag was at an all-time low with 26.5 months in
1990 but has increased to more than 31 months in 1996. However, since they have no data on pending
cases, no information is available for years after 1996.
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the USPTO is currently being criticized for a number of weaknesses, including the bad
quality of patent examination.22 In Europe, the development of patent examination
over time has not been studied as of yet. The empirical analysis below is meant to cast
some light on the actual process of patent examination at the European Patent Office.
3.2 Determinants of Decision-Making Lags at the European
Patent Office
The following discussion focuses on the behavioral and institutional aspects of decision-
making in the course of patent examination. After all it appears unlikely that patent
offices implement examination following merely the above normative logic. The deter-
minants that are within the focus of this study belong to the three categories described
in the introduction above: the examination capacity at the patent office (combining
information on the number of examiners as well as new and pending applications), the
difficulty of the individual examination task itself, and institutional factors that would
– ceteris paribus – lead to an acceleration or deceleration of the examination process.
We emphasize that we do not consider patent value per se as a causal determinant of
examination lags because there is no convincing theoretical argument for doing so, and
we discuss this point below in more detail.
First, in the short-run a patent office will not be able to adjust search and examina-
tion staff optimally to short-term changes in the demand for patent protection unless
quality standards are allowed to deteriorate.23 The EPO provides a telling example
in this context. Since the training of patent examiners takes up to three years at the
EPO, one should expect major lags in the adjustment of examination capacity. In-
creases in patent office workload should therefore lead to slower patent examination
and longer lags. We seek to test this hypothesis later on by taking pending patents rel-
ative to patent office examination and search employees as a measure of EPO capacity
utilization.
Second, the nature of patent examination has changed over time. Patent applica-
tions are increasing in complexity and volume (van Zeebroeck et al. 2005, Harhoff 2006).
Both factors should lead to longer examination durations, ceteris paribus. Below, var-
ious measures of an application’s complexity are introduced, including the number of
claims, the number of technical fields, and the number of backward and forward cita-
tions. The development of these characteristics over time is also documented in Section
4.
22See Graham et al. (2002) and Hall & Harhoff (2004) for a discussion of these issues and further
references.
23By patent quality, we mean the degree to which the patent examiner takes into account the full
state of prior art and the extent to which the applicant is forced to reveal its invention fully. While
the first aspect reflects the quality of document search in the patent office, the second is a measure
of how skillful the examiner is in the negotiation with the patent applicant. A broader discussion of
patent quality is included in Hall et al. (2003).
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Third, various statutory and legal provisions have direct implications for the pro-
cessing of patent applications. These need to be considered carefully in order to avoid
spurious results in a multivariate setting. For example, PCT applications allow patent
applicants to delay major decisions for thirty months past the priority date. Inevitably,
this institutional characteristic of PCT patents will have implications for the duration
of examination. Moreover, institutions like the request for accelerated examination
(which concedes accelerated examination to the patent applicant for the payment of a
certain fee, see Notice of the President of the EPO, OJ 7/1997, p. 340 and E-VIII, p.
3) are likely to reduce the overall time of examination.
Finally, it should be taken into account that the examination process is subject
to various strategic incentives of the patent applicant. These incentives should be
especially pronounced in cases where the patent applicant attaches high private value
to the underlying invention. On the one hand, applicants might show a higher level
of cooperation with the examiner during the examination (e.g. by responding faster
to requests) in order to shorten examination time and to get full patent protection
earlier. On the other hand, if patent applicants receive restrictive search reports or the
examiners requests drastic changes in the claims which could reduce the value of the
patent, applicants might be more willing to engage in lengthy negotiations with the
examiner if the underlying invention is potentially valuable. Moreover, some applicants,
e.g., in biotechnology, may seek to delay the patent grant, since it triggers the need
to initiate the relatively expensive national validation of the EPO grant immediately.
This is an effect that we cannot identify at this point, but we control for it using
technical field dummies. Clearly, this issue requires attention in future work. We try
to disentangle different incentives in the empirical part of the part. The data and
variables used are introduced in the next section.
4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
4.1 Data Source
The European Patent Office (EPO) provides comprehensive patent information with
its Online European Patent Register at http://www.epoline.org. This database covers
published European patent applications as well as published international patent appli-
cations (PCT) seeking patent protection via the EPO in one or more member states of
the European Patent Convention. It provides bibliographic data and also procedural
information covering legal decisions made over the life span of an individual patent
application. The dataset used for this study is an image of this data as provided by
the EPO on March, 31st, 2003 via www.epoline.org and covers 1,266,506 patent files
with application dates ranging from June, 1st, 1978 to July, 25th, 2002. In addition,
we have obtained information on the number of claims from the EPASYS directory
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excerpts which were kindly made available by the EPO. Moreover, in order to have an
estimate of the EPO’s processing capacity, the average number of employees by year
has been obtained from the EPO’s Annual Report 2003.
The inclusion of forward citations (see below) in the multivariate analysis requires a
restriction of the dataset to patents with application dates prior to February, 14th,1998.
This restriction eliminates truncation problems in the number of citations received by
other patents which is computed as the total number of citations within five years after
application.
4.2 Variables
In the following, we briefly describe the variables computed from our data sources.
Decision lag. The data from the Online European Patent Register include the date
of filing of a patent application and the date of the termination of the subsequent
examination procedure as well as the outcome of the process. Using this information,
we compute the total duration of the examination period as the difference between the
two dates. This variable reflects the duration we want to model in the subsequent part
of the paper.
Status of the application. For each application it is known whether it is still under
examination (PENDING) or whether the examination procedure has been terminated
by the end of the observation period. Once an application has been granted (GRANT)
or once the examiner has issued a final refusal to grant a patent (REFUSED), the
examination procedure is closed. Additionally, the examination can also be terminated
for reasons which lie outside the control of the patent office: First, the patent applicant
might decide to withdraw (WITHDRAWN) his application from the office – perhaps
due to unsatisfying results contained in the search report. Withdrawals are inferred by
the EPO if the applicant does not request examination within six months of receipt
of the search report or if the applicant ceases to communicate with the EPO at some
point after having requested examination. Second, applications might drop out of the
examination procedure for extra-ordinary reasons like the death of the applicant or the
non-payment of fees. Since the number of these losses is extremely small and causes
for these types of losses are outside of the procedural focus we apply here, we code
these cases also as withdrawals.
Workload. We compute this variable in order to characterize the capacity situation
at the EPO. Workload is defined as the number of pending cases divided by the number
of examiners (’a-posts’) at the EPO at a given point in time. The number of pending
cases is computed on a daily basis, but the employee figures reflecting the recruiting
policy of the EPO are only available on an annual basis. We distinguish the number of
13
pending cases for 30 different technical fields24 and compute a WORKLOAD variable as
an approximation for the workload within each class defined by the number of pending
cases in a technical field divided by the total number of examiners at the EPO at a
given point of time.25
Number of claims. Each patent contains a set of claims that marks the boundaries
of the patent. The claims of a patent state essential features of the underlying invention.
The economic interpretation of the total number of claims is not straight forward. On
the one hand, it can be argued that each additional claim raises the probability of
an infringement and therefore increases the breadth and the value of a patent. On
the other hand, each additional claim in a patent makes the description of the claimed
invention more specific and might narrow the scope of the protected area and hence the
value of the property right (see Lanjouw & Schankerman (1999) for a discussion of this
trade-off). We employ the number of claims with a more neutral interpretation in mind
– the number of claims simply indicates the complexity of the cases to be examined
by the patent office; hence, a larger number of claims should lead to an increase in
the time needed for examination (irrespective of the examination outcome), since each
claim must be checked and validated by the examiner.26
Number of designated states. As any EPO patent becomes a bundle of national
patent rights once it is granted, each applicant has to specify the countries in which he
wants to obtain patent protection for his invention.27 The more countries are designated
in an application the higher the resulting expected fees for keeping the patent alive in
each designated country. Harhoff et al. (2003) show that the number of designated
countries is correlated with patent value while Guellec & Pottelsberghe (2000) come
to more ambiguous findings.
References to patent literature. The search report published by the EPO yields
information on the state of the art relevant for the patentability of the application. The
state of the art is mostly documented by references to patents or to the non-patent
literature. Relevant documents are referenced in the search report and are subsequently
also published in the patent role. One major advantage of the EPO citation data we use
in our study over the USPTO citation data is the assignment of references to certain
24The categorization is based on the OST-INPI/FhG-ISI technology nomenclature (see Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development 1994, p. 77).
25This is only a rough measure of the capacity situation in the 30 technical fields. A more refined
measure would take the number of examiners in a given field as its denominator but field-specific
personnel data are not available.
26Re´gibeau & Rockett (2003) also use the number of claims as a measure of complexity in their
estimations. Popp et al. (2003) include the number of claims, the number of references, the number
of drawings and the number of pages of a patent application in their analysis.
27Currently, a patent application at the EPO can designate 36 states which are either members or
affiliated to the European Patent Treaty.
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categories. All documents cited in the search report are identified by a particular letter
in the first column of the search report representing the cited category (combinations
are possible). Table 1 contains a brief description of the meaning of the different
categories. X citations are the most important ones as to patentability of an invention.
In case an application receives an X citation this indicates that the claimed invention
does not meet the requirements novelty or inventive step. Type Y references – when
taken together or in conjunction with other documents – may have the same effect, but
less directly so. Type A references merely provide technical background information.
We will use these classification below in order to construct more specific patent citation
indicators than has been possible with USPTO citations.
In our analysis several variables based on references to the patent literature are
included. First, we consider the total number of patent references, also referred to
as backward citations. Additionally, we include the share of citations which are par-
ticularly relevant if combined with another document of the same category (type Y
references), the share of citations indicating that the claimed invention cannot be con-
sidered to be novel or to involve an inventive step (type X references) and the share
of documents already cited in the patent application and considered relevant by the
examiner (type D references). A detailed description of the use of patent citations in
economic analysis can be found in Michael & Bettels (2001) and Harhoff et al. (2006).
References to the non-patent literature. In order to document the prior state
of the art the patent office also refers to non-patent literature (mainly scientific pub-
lications). A simple count of the total number of references to non-patent literature
is included in the following analysis. We argue that the number of references to non-
patent literature measures the strength of a patent’s science linkage. For a survey of
the literature on this topic see Meyer (2000a).
Forward citations. Similar to scientific publications, citations received from subse-
quent patents are an indicator that the cited patent has contributed to the state of
the art in a certain field. For each patent in our sample, we compute the number of
forward citations as the number of citations a patent received from subsequent Euro-
pean patents within five years after application. Numerous studies found that forward
citations are highly correlated with the monetary value of patents (see Harhoff et al.
(1999), Lanjouw & Schankerman (1999) or Trajtenberg (1990)).28 In order to construct
a more refined citation measure we include the share of type Y, type X and type D
citations in our regressions.
28The intricacies of working with European patent citations are well-known by now. We follow the
recommendations made in Harhoff et al. (2006) for computing citation counts.
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Measures of originality and generality. The ORIGINALITY and GENERAL-
ITY indicators are citation-based indices which measure different aspects of the patented
innovation and their links to other innovations. The GENERALITY measure is based
on the forward citations a patent receives and is defined as
GENERALITY = 1−
ni∑
k=1
s2ik
where s2ik is the percentage of citations received by a patent i that belong to patent
class k out of nk patent classes. The GENERALITY index will be high, if a patent
is cited by subsequent patents that belong to a wide range of fields and low, if most
referring citations are concentrated in a few fields. Hence, a high GENERALITY index
suggests that the patent influenced subsequent innovations in a variety of different
fields and is more general. ORIGINALITY is defined in the same way except that it is
based on references to the patent literature made in the patent’s search report. A low
ORIGINALITY index indicates that the patent’s search report cites only patents from
a narrow set of technologies and is therefore less original than an patent with a high
ORIGINALITY index. Both measures have been first proposed by Trajtenberg et al.
(1997). For the analysis we compute both indices distinguishing between 30 different
technical fields.
Number of International Patent Classification (IPC) assignments. A patent
is assigned to one or more 9-digit categories of the IPC system during the examination
period depending on its applicability in different technical fields. We interpret the
number of IPC classes as a measure of complexity of the examination task.
Request for accelerated examination. When filing a patent application the ap-
plicant can request an accelerated examination leading to a shortened examination
procedure (see Section 2). A binary variable indicating whether this is true or not for
the patent under consideration is included in the analysis.
PCT-Application. For each patent we include a dummy variable indicating, whether
an international application within the PCT-framework (see Section 2 for details) has
been filed.
In addition to the variables described above we further control for the filing date
and the technical field a patent application was assigned to by the EPO. In order to do
so, we include dummy variables for the year of application as well as dummy variables
for 30 technical fields based on the OST-INPI/FhG-ISI Technology classification (see
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 1994, p. 77).
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4.3 Descriptive Statistics
Before working with datasets that are random samples from the total population, we
present descriptive statistics of the overall population outcomes. Table 2 displays basic
statistics on decision lags by year of application. The larger share of EPO applications
is granted – in the time window covering the years from 1978 to 1995, the grant rate is
63.5 percent. Only 5.1 percent of the cases are actually explicitly refused by the patent
examiner, while 27.4 percent are withdrawn by the applicants themselves after receiving
a sufficiently negative search report or ’skeptical’ communication from the examiner.
Note that even restricting the sample to applications from 1978 to 1995, 3.9 percent
of all cases are still pending. The final two columns show that of the refused cases, a
relatively large share (on average about one fifth) enter the appeal against refusal to
grant, and about half of these cases are subsequently awarded a patent grant.
In Table 3, the OST-INPI/FhG-ISI Technology classification is used to distinguish
between different technical fields (see Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development 1994, p. 77). We would expect to see some variation in decision-making
processes depending on the relative novelty and complexity of the technical matter
embedded in the patent applications. The grant rate varies between 56.5 percent
in consumer goods and equipment (area 29) and 70.8 percent in nuclear engineering
(area 9). Low grant rates are concomitant with high shares of withdrawals, while the
share of applicants receiving an explicit refusal is quite stable across technical fields.
Exceptions exist, though: in semiconductors (area 5), macromolecular chemistry (area
11), and chemical engineering (area 18) the rate of refusals exceeds six percent. In
semiconductors, almost every third refusal is contested in the appeals procedure, and
only one third of them are successful. This may attest to the rivalry around intellectual
property in this field.
Taking a look at the demand side of patent protection, we find that applications
rose from an annual number of 12,384 in 1979, the first full year of operation of the
EPO, to more than 100,000 in 2001 (see Figure 4). Since the examination of each patent
application takes several years, the growth in application numbers led to the emergence
of a backlog of pending cases at the EPO, which grew to more than 400,000 pending
patent applications at the end of 2000 (see Figure 4). The most evident explanation
for this strong growth of the backlog is an insufficient expansion of the workforce at the
EPO leading to a growing workload for each examiner and hence longer examination
duration for individual patents. In fact, the number of examiners (A-posts) at the EPO
grew from 545 to 3,861 in the period from 1978 to 2001 (European Patent Office 2003).
Dividing the number of pending cases by the according number of examiners yields the
average workload of each examiner which dramatically increased since the foundation
of the EPO (see Figure 5). This strong increase in the workload of the patent examiner
might be one explanation for the lengthening of the examination procedure.
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Another potential explanation for the lengthening of the examination procedure can
be found in the growing complexity of patent applications over the last two decades.
Table 4 shows the development of several measures of an application’s complexity on
an annual basis. The average number of claims per patent, for example, rose by more
then 50% from 9.84 in 1978 to 15.36 in 1998. Since an examiner has to validate the
formulation and the justification of each of the claims, we expect that a growing number
of claims leads to a longer examination period, everything else being equal.
Additionally, the fraction of patent applications at the EPO that were filed as PCT
applications grew even faster: by 1998, 50% of the applications filed also applied for
international patent protection under the PCT, which is more than the eightfold of
the level in 1978. The examination of a combined EPO/ PCT-application is more
time-consuming than a pure EPO-application, since various aspects of search and ex-
amination of the application have to take different legal frameworks into account – the
EPO and the PCT guidelines. Table 4 also shows the average number of references
made to previous patents and to non-patent literature. While the number of back-
ward citations to previous patents rose slightly at the end of the 90s, the number of
references to non-patent literature (mostly scientific publications) rose by almost 50%
within the same period. Both variables indicate higher demand for the search capacity
at the EPO and could possibly have led to longer examination lags.
5 Survival Analysis
5.1 Model Specification
In order to analyze the determinants of the duration of the examination process at the
European Patent Office, we consider survival time as a nonnegative random variable
T .29 A basic concept for the analysis of survival times is the hazard function λ(t),
which is defined as the limit
λ(t) = lim
∆t→0
P (t ≤ T < t+∆t | T ≥ t)
∆t
(1)
and measures the instantaneous failure rate at time t, given that the individual
survives until t. In the following, different survival models are estimated, where the
hazard function depends on a set of covariates x′ = (x1, . . . , xp) that influence the
survival time T .
The reference model for multivariate survival analysis is Cox’s Proportional Hazard
(PH) model (Cox 1972), where the hazard rate is assumed to be the product
λ(t, x) = λ0(t) exp(x1β1 + . . .+ xpβp) = λ0(t) exp(x
′β). (2)
29The survival time is the time between the filing of a patent application at the patent office and
the final decision on the application.
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In this model, the baseline hazard rate λ0(t) which is a function of survival time
remains unspecified and, through the exponential link function, the covariates x act
multiplicatively on the hazard rate.
Under this model, the ratio of the hazard functions HR for two subjects with
differing covariate values x1 and x2 is
HR =
λ0(t) exp(x
′
1β)
λ0(t) exp(x′2β)
=
exp(x′1β)
exp(x′2β)
= exp β((x1 − x2)). (3)
The parameter estimates from this model are obtained by maximizing the partial
log-likelihood function
lnL =
D∑
j=1
[
∑
kDj
x′kβ − dj ln
∑
iRj
exp(x′iβ)] (4)
where j indexes the ordered failure times t(j) (j = 1, ..., D), Dj is the set of dj
observations that fail at t(j), dj is the number of failures at t(j), and Rj is the set
of observations k that are at risk at time t(j) ,i.e., all k such that t0k < t(j) ≤ tk
(Kalbfleisch & Prentice 2002).
Accelerated failture time (AFT) models are an alternative to the Cox PH model.
In these models, the hazard function is specified as
λ(t, x) = λ0(t exp(x
′β))(exp(x′β)). (5)
Here, the effect of the explanatory variables on the survival time is direct, acceler-
ating or decelerating the time of failure. Moreover, this model can be specified relating
the logarithm of the survival time to its explanatory variables with
lnT = Xγ +  (6)
where γj = −βj for j = 1, ..., p and T follows a log-logistic distribution. Estimation
of the parameters is carried out by maximizing the according log-likelihood.
All covariates in our regression are time-invariant. Since we include the number of
forward citations received within 5 years after application the sample is restricted to
the years between 1978 to 1998. Since the EPO started its operations only in 1978
there might be a ’starting-effect’ due to new processes for examiners and applicants
causing longer examinations. We therefore exclude the first three years of operations
from our regression analysis. Further, for ease of computation we draw a 25% sample
from the remaining patents. Therefore, the estimations are based on the resulting
random sample of 215,259 patents.
5.2 Results
In order to characterize differences in the processes leading to either withdrawal of the
application, a refusal of the patent grant or an actual patent grant, we present not
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only results from the survival analysis based on pooled data, ignoring the outcome
of the examination process, but also results from competing risk specifications. In
the competing risk specification we distinguish between examinations which lead to a
grant, withdrawal or refusal of the patent application. Fixed effects are included for 30
technical fields and for each year of the observational period which we do not report
here for reasons of brevity.30
We comment on the pooled risk estimates before discussing to the competing risk
specification (see Table 5, column (1)).31 This column would be relevant for a policy-
maker who knows that all three outcomes consume the same amount of resources or who
does not attach any other form of relevance to the different outcomes. Most coefficients
are statistically relevant and carry the expected sign. Our estimation confirms the
expectation with regard to current capacity situation at the EPO. An increase in the
workload per examiner at the time of application leads to longer examination lags.
Moreover, characteristics which are related to the complexity of the examination
task are associated with longer examination times. We observe highly significant effects
of the number of references in the search report, of the number of different four-digit
IPC classes a patent is classified to be in and also of the number of claims which
have to be examined. Turning to the patent characteristics which we derived from the
references and citations we observe that patents which are more original require longer
examination. This is perfectly in line with expectations, since the search for prior art
is more complicated if more different technical fields have to be checked. Moreover, we
observe an increase in examination times caused by higher shares of type X references
(backward citations) which lower the chances of getting the patent granted. We assume
that patent applicants engage in more intensive negotiations with patent examiners in
these cases, thus lengthening the whole examination process. An interesting finding
is that – in the pooled risk specification – the examination of patents which are more
important according to our measure forward citations, require more time than the
examination of less often cited patents. However, the competing risk specification will
show that this finding stems from the combination of effects which affect examination
outcomes differentially.
In columns (2), (3) and (4) of Table 5, the results from the competing risks speci-
fication are presented. We test whether exits to different states in the competing risk
specification are behaviorally distinct (rather than simply incidental) relying on the
test proposed by Narendranathan & Stewart (1991) which is a test of the hypothesis
that the cause-specific hazards are all proportional to one another (i.e. that all pa-
rameters except the intercepts are equal across the hazards). The test statistic TS
30Results for the fixed effects and the time dummies are available upon request.
31In Table 5 we report estimated coefficients rather than hazard rates. Coefficients smaller than
zero indicate that an increase in a variable decreases the likelihood of an exit in t + ∆t. Negative
coefficients therefore indicate that an increase in the corresponding variable is associated with longer
examination periods.
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proposed by Narendranathan & Stewart (1991) is given by
TS = 2[ln(LCR)− ln(LSR)−
∑
j
nj ln(pj)] (7)
where ln(LRC) is the maximised log-likelihood from the competing risk model (the
sum of those from the component risk models), ln(LSR) is the maximised log-likelihood
from the single-risk model, nj is the number of exits to state j and pj = nj/
∑
j nj, where
there are j = 1, . . . , J destination states. The test-statistic is distributed Chi-squared
with degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions. For our model we can reject
the null hypothesis of risk proportionality at 1% of significance (TS = 323, 515.13),
i.e., we reject that the different forms of exit are behaviorally equal.32
The results from the competing risk specification are interesting, since they demon-
strate that some of the effects apparent in column (1) come about as a complex com-
bination of individual risk determinants. For example, while the generality variable
affects the overall hazard negatively, it has a positive effect on the grant hazard (col-
umn 2) and it lengthens the time period until patents are withdrawn. We observe also
a strong significant influence of the share of X references which are damaging to the
claimed novelty or inventive step of the invention underlying the patent application.
A high share of type X references slows down the granting process while leading to
early withdrawals. We find the inverse effect for the share of type D references. These
are documents which have already been referenced in the patent application by the
applicant and have been considered relevant by the examiner. The estimation results
confirm our expectation that a search report which contains a high share of type D
references is an indication for a well documented patent application alleviating the
search for prior art during its examination. In line with this interpretation a higher
share of D references leads to earlier patent grants. Moreover, applications which are
well documented by the applicant according to this measure are withdrawn less early.
More important, for granted patents we find a positive impact of the number of
forward citations on the hazard (Column 2) while the effect is negative in the case of
withdrawn and refused applications (Columns 3 and 4).33 This is presumably reflect-
ing an endogenous component of an applicant’s behavior. Inventions which are cited
frequently by subsequent patents are potentially valuable if they receive a patent grant
– they are not abandoned as quickly as other patent applications. It should be noted
that our finding that more important applications are processed faster by the EPO
is in line with theoretical predictions from a model on the optimal length of patent
examination provided by Re´gibeau & Rockett (2003). Moreover, our results suggest
32Reported test statistics are based on the Cox PH specification. Results for the AFT specification
are similar.
33Note that the number of designated countries which is also correlated to patent value has a
different effect. However, this effect is small in magnitude compared to the effect of forward citations.
Removing the number of designated countries from the regressions does not alter the results for the
number of forward citations.
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that the conclusion of Johnson & Popp (2003) that more important patents experience
longer grant lags at the USPTO than less valuable patents cannot be confirmed for the
EPO. Moreover, we find that a high share of type D citations decreases the duration
of examination processes leading to a patent grant while increasing the duration for
withdrawals and refusals. Type D citations typically result from self-citations (Harhoff
et al. 2006), i.e., citations from patent applications of the same applicant. Therefore
patents with a high share of type D citations are likely to be part of a sequence of
technically related patent applications and therefore be of particular importance to
the applicant. The effect of the share of type D citations might therefore again reflect
endogenous applicant behavior as described above.
Finally, the competing risk specification confirms our hypotheses with regard to
legal provisions. The grant lags of patent applications filed under the PCT-treaty are
significantly longer than for non-PCT applications. Another interesting effect concerns
the request for accelerated examination (RACCEXAM) which is statistically unsur-
prising in column (1) and a significant determinant of all three risks when these are
treated separately. Grants are accelerated by this request, while withdrawals are slowed
down and refusals are not affected significantly. We conclude that the request signals
potentially valuable patents which applicants are hesitant to give up. We also observe a
qualitatively homogenous effect of the number of claims on the different outcomes. An
increase in the number of claims clearly increases the length of the examination period
of patent applications irrespective of the outcome. This could be explained by the fact
that each additional claim requires some extra-time in the examination process.
In addition to the Cox PH model we also fit AFT models and report estimation
results for pooled and competing risk specifications in Table 6. The results from these
purely parametric specifications largely confirm the findings from the semi-parametric
Cox PH models, but allow us to determine the percentage change of pendency times
associated with a one-unit increase of the independent variables.34 The most important
effects on the duration of the examination are associated with institutional features of
the application process. In fact, the filing of a request for accelerated examination re-
duces its duration by 17.9% in the pooled model. Again, this effect is the combination
of a reduction of examination times by 26.3% in the case of granted applications and a
prolongation of durations by 59.8% for withdrawn applications. These opposite effects
reflect endogenous behavior of the applicants (see above). We obtain slightly different
reuslts for applications filed via the PCT path. While the duration of examination
for granted application is increased by only 3.9%, withdrawals are delayed by 19.9%.
Moreover, we also observe significant effects associated with the complexity of the ex-
amination task. For example, one additional claim in the patent application lengthens
34Note that we report exponentiated coefficients of the AFT specification in Table 6 which can
directly be interpreted as percentage change of pendency times associated with a one-unit increase of
the respective variable.
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the duration of examination by 0.5%, one additional patent reference by 0.8% and
one additional non-patent reference by 2.8% in the pooled model. The different effect
of patent and non-patent references can be attributed to the fact that it is harder
for patent examiners to research non-patent references like scientific journals than to
research prior patents.
6 Conclusion
The growth in patenting has been felt by all major patent offices, confronting them
with the challenge of dealing with an increasing workload in the processing of patent
applications. In particular, the number of patent applications at the EPO almost
tripled between 1990 and 2000 and led to a considerable backlog of more than 400,000
pending patent applications in 2000. This development caused a significant increase in
the pendency times of EPO patent applications in the 90s which drew the interest of
policy makers and researchers.
In this paper, we have presented first results from a comprehensive analysis of
the decision-making lags and the outcomes of patent examination at the EPO. We
have presented estimates from a duration analysis in which we modeled the pooled
hazard of outcomes as well as separate hazards of the applications becoming granted
patents, being withdrawn or being refused. In order to disentangle different sources
of the recent increase in examination lags, we include variables which are correlates of
the capacity situation at the EPO, of the complexity of the examination task, and of
legal institutions influencing the duration of examination. In line with our theoretical
expectations, we find that the observed increase in pendency times is not only caused
by the increase in application figures leading to a higher workload at the EPO. In fact,
increasing complexity of patent applications also leads to longer pendency times since
decisions on more complicated applications require more time than decisions regarding
an average patent. Allowing for a competing risk specification, we find more complex
patterns which reflect largely the endogenous behavior of the applicants. In particular,
we find that applicants are less willing to abandon applications relating to inventions
which are potentially valuable compared to other applications. The duration of the
examination period is lengthened for important patent applications, if the patent is
not granted. Moreover, we find that more important patents are approved faster than
other patents, which is in line with the predictions of a model on the optimal length
of patent examination provided by Re´gibeau & Rockett (2003).
In a reaction to the challenge posed by the increase in application figures and
pendency times, the EPO initiated several projects aiming at ameliorating the current
situation.35 However, it should be noted that the problem is not confined to the EPO
35For an introduction see ’Mastering the Workload’, EPO Document CA/132/02, available
at http://mtw.european-patent-office.org/workload/site/en/reference.html, latest visit
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alone, as previous studies of Popp et al. (2003) and Re´gibeau & Rockett (2003) have
shown. Application figures rose similarly at the USPTO and the JPO. Further, the
share of patents which are filed under the PCT considerably increased over the last
years, pointing to another international dimension of the problem.
March, 22nd, 2005.
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7 Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Number of patent applications at the EPO: — All Applications, - - -
Applications filed under PCT.
Figure 2: Examination of patent applications at the European Patent Office.
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Figure 5: Number of pending cases per examiner (WORKLOAD) at the EPO.
Type Description
X Particularly relevant documents when taken alone (a claimed invention
cannot be considered novel or cannot be considered to involve an inventive
step)
Y Particularly relevant if combined with another document of the same cat-
egory
A Documents defining the general state of the art
O Documents referring to non-written disclosure
P Intermediate documents (documents published between the date of filing
and the priority date)
T Documents relating to theory or principle underlying the invention (doc-
uments which were published after the filing date and are not in conflict
with the application, but were cited for a better understanding of the
invention)
E Potentially conflicting patent documents, published on or after the filing
date of the underlying invention
D Document already cited in the application
L Document cited for other reasons (e.g., a document which may throw
doubt on a priority claim)
Table 1: Overview over different types of references included in the search report by
the EPO. Source: EPO Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office,
2003.
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Application Cases PCT Directly Withdrawal of Refusal Application Appeal against Granted
Year Application Granted Application of Grant Pending Grant Refusal after Appeal
% % % % % % %
1978 3,902 6.4 70.0 25.2 4.6 0.2 2.5 1.5
1979 12,392 8.9 69.6 24.1 6.2 0.1 2.4 1.4
1980 19,724 9.1 69.3 24.2 6.5 0 1.7 1.0
1981 24,957 8.5 68.7 25.4 5.9 0 1.3 0.8
1982 28,518 9.1 69.0 25.8 5.2 0 1.1 0.6
1983 31,609 9.4 68.3 26.5 5.2 0 1.3 0.8
1984 36,952 8.8 67.4 27.9 4.7 0 1.2 0.7
1985 39,371 12.0 67.0 28.9 4.1 0.1 1.0 0.5
1986 43,080 12.7 66.1 29.0 4.8 0.1 1.2 0.6
1987 45,803 13.1 65.3 29.4 5.2 0.1 1.1 0.6
1988 52,165 15.0 64.5 29.8 5.5 0.2 1.0 0.5
1989 57,669 15.6 62.6 31.3 5.7 0.4 0.9 0.5
1990 63,811 19.0 64.4 29.3 5.6 0.7 0.8 0.4
1991 59,092 24.2 65.2 27.9 5.6 1.3 0.8 0.3
1992 60,186 25.7 64.2 27.8 5.4 2.5 0.7 0.2
1993 59,448 30.3 63.6 25.6 5.2 5.5 0.7 0.2
1994 60,924 34.8 58.3 25.0 4.7 11.9 0.6 0.1
1995 63,402 39.9 47.8 23.7 3.7 24.8 0.4 0.1
Total 763,005 20.1 63.5 27.4 5.1 3.9 0.9 0.9
(1978-1995)
Table 2: EPO patent applications and application outcomes by application year. (Note: The category ’application withdrawn’ also
includes cases in which patents were consolidated or applications were suspended. These are typically less than 0.1 percent of all
applications in any year.)
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Area Area Name Cases PCT Directly Withdrawal Refusal Appeal against Granted
Applications Granted of Application of Grant Grant Refusal after Appeal
% % % % % %
1 Electr. Machinery, Electrical Energy 19,276 13.0 64.1 30.4 5.3 0.8 0.5
2 Audiovisual Technology 10,454 11.6 70.7 24.6 4.4 1.1 0.6
3 Telecommunications 13,126 13.8 67.5 26.3 5.8 1.2 0.6
4 Information Technology 10,288 12.9 62.9 30.8 5.8 1.1 0.5
5 Semiconductors 6,813 9.9 59.9 30.3 9.0 3.1 1.1
6 Optics 12,087 13.0 67.6 27.3 4.6 0.9 0.4
7 Analysis, Measurement, Control Tech. 22,061 19.1 62.8 31.9 5.1 0.9 0.5
8 Medical Technology 11,522 22.9 61.2 32.8 5.7 1.1 0.5
9 Nuclear Engineering 1,989 11.2 70.8 24.0 5.1 1.0 0.5
10 Organic Fine Chemistry 23,045 11.6 63.4 30.3 5.9 0.7 0.3
11 Macromolecular Chem., Polymers 15,453 9.1 62.1 31.2 6.5 1.7 0.9
12 Pharmaceuticals, Cosmetics 8,337 24.3 62.4 30.7 6.0 1.0 0.4
13 Biotechnology 6,684 25.0 55.1 36.1 5.9 0.8 0.4
14 Agriculture, Food Chem. 2,824 16.0 64.0 31.3 4.6 0.7 0.4
15 Chem. & Petrol Ind., Basic Mat. Chem. 8,335 13.9 67.0 27.6 5.4 1.4 0.8
16 Surface Technology, Coating 5,910 16.7 66.4 28.2 5.2 0.9 0.6
17 Materials, Metallurgy 9,131 13.8 69.9 24.9 5.1 0.8 0.4
18 Chemical Engineering 10,020 18.0 65.3 28.6 6.1 1.7 1.1
19 Mat. Proc., Textiles, Paper 13,743 13.4 66.7 28.8 4.4 0.7 0.4
20 Handling, Printing 15,883 13.5 67.7 27.6 4.5 0.6 0.4
21 Agricultural & Food Proc. 4,328 14.3 60.3 34.6 5.1 0.9 0.5
22 Environmental Technology 2,213 17.7 62.8 31.8 5.3 1.5 0.7
23 Machine Tools 8,572 16.1 65.2 30.2 4.5 0.8 0.4
24 Engines, Pumps, Turbines 7,124 17.7 70.6 24.7 4.7 1.1 0.6
25 Thermal Proc. & Apparatus 4,321 16.4 64.3 30.2 5.4 1.3 1.0
26 Mechanical Elements 10,817 15.1 69.5 26.5 4.0 0.6 0.4
27 Transport 12,213 13.9 69.5 26.1 4.4 0.4 0.2
28 Space Technology, Weapons 1,970 13.8 62.3 33.3 4.4 0.6 0.2
29 Consumer Goods & Equipment 12,803 15.5 56.5 39.2 4.2 0.5 0.3
30 Civil Eng., Building, Mining 10,536 15.1 64.9 30.4 4.7 0.8 0.4
Total 301,899 15.0 64.8 29.7 5.2 1.0 0.5
Table 3: EPO application outcomes by technical field (application years 1980–1990). (Note: Pending cases are not documented here.)
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Application Number of Share of Applications References to References to
Year Claims via PCT patents non-patent literature
1978 9.84 0.06 4.47 0.39
1979 9.97 0.09 4.96 0.40
1980 10.06 0.09 4.73 0.47
1981 10.41 0.09 4.45 0.50
1982 10.73 0.09 4.42 0.55
1983 10.52 0.09 4.36 0.60
1984 10.85 0.09 4.22 0.61
1985 11.16 0.12 4.30 0.67
1986 11.18 0.13 4.27 0.73
1987 11.40 0.13 4.23 0.80
1988 11.54 0.15 4.13 0.81
1989 11.82 0.16 4.11 0.87
1990 12.03 0.19 4.14 0.91
1991 12.32 0.24 4.21 0.98
1992 12.44 0.26 4.30 0.98
1993 12.95 0.30 4.49 0.99
1994 13.29 0.35 4.61 0.98
1995 13.79 0.39 4.73 0.94
1996 14.34 0.45 5.02 0.93
1997 14.80 0.47 4.98 0.90
1998 15.36 0.50 4.84 0.86
Average 13.40 0.30 4.18 0.80
Table 4: Mean values of selected patent indicators by application year.
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Duration Pooled Competing Risks
Granted Withdrawn Refused
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Capacity Measure
WORKLOAD -0.055** -0.097** 0.017* -0.055**
(0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.019)
Patent Characteristics
ORIGINALITY -0.176** -0.160** -0.168** -0.348**
(0.021) (0.026) (0.039) (0.104)
GENERALITY -0.057** -0.008 -0.129** 0.023
(0.021) (0.025) (0.046) (0.111)
PCT APPLICATION -0.136** -0.086** -0.269** -0.026
(0.006) (0.007) (0.011) (0.027)
ACCELERATED EXAM. 0.318** 0.645** -0.859** -0.018
(0.015) (0.017) (0.047) (0.084)
CLAIMS -0.012** -0.015** -0.005** -0.014**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
IPC CLASSES -0.042** -0.060** -0.005 -0.044**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.008)
DESIGNATED COUNTRIES 0.000 -0.011** 0.019** 0.024**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
Reference Measures
NO. OF PAT. REFERENCES -0.020** -0.034** 0.012** -0.015**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004)
NO. OF NON-PAT. REF. -0.059** -0.065** -0.051** -0.031**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.009)
SHARE OF X REFERENCES -0.209** -0.536** 0.417** -0.198**
(0.008) (0.011) (0.014) (0.039)
SHARE OF Y REFERENCES -0.127** -0.285** 0.233** -0.128**
(0.009) (0.011) (0.016) (0.043)
SHARE OF D REFERENCES 0.093** 0.266** -0.381** 0.142**
(0.011) (0.013) (0.023) (0.053)
Citation Measures
NUMBER OF CITATIONS -0.016** 0.012** -0.108** -0.071**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005)
SHARE OF X CITATIONS -0.067** -0.070** -0.007 -0.043
(0.011) (0.014) (0.021) (0.053)
SHARE OF Y CITATIONS -0.043** -0.014 -0.036 -0.179*
(0.014) (0.017) (0.027) (0.071)
SHARE OF D CITATIONS -0.012 0.190** -0.556** -0.233**
(0.016) (0.018) (0.036) (0.082)
Observations 215,259 215,259 215,259 215,259
Exits 200,040 132,697 58,485 8,858
Log Likelihood -2,251,713.3 -1,469,520 -677,407.74 -97,027.23
LR χ2(63) 43,647.85 46,248.87 10,590.02 2,325.60
Table 5: Estimation results from Cox Proportional Hazards Models. Estimates from a
pooled and a competing risk specification are displayed. The estimation includes year
dummies and dummy variables for 30 technological fields.
**: 1% significant, *: 5% significant. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Duration Pooled Competing Risks
Granted Withdrawn Refused
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Capacity Measure
WORKLOAD 1.019** 1.028** 0.990* 1.012*
(0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.006)
Patent Characteristics
ORIGINALITY 1.070** 1.052** 1.109** 1.117**
(0.009) (0.008) (0.024) (0.034)
GENERALITY 1.038** 1.011 1.091** 0.984
(0.008) (0.007) (0.027) (0.032)
PCT APPLICATION 1.087** 1.039** 1.199** 0.987
(0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.008)
ACCELERATED EXAM. 0.821** 0.737** 1.598** 1.025
(0.005) (0.004) (0.040) (0.026)
CLAIMS 1.005** 1.005** 1.003** 1.004**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
IPC CLASSES 1.014** 1.018** 1.004* 1.015**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
DESIGNATED COUNTRIES 0.999** 1.002** 0.990** 0.993**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Reference Measures
NO. OF PAT. REFERENCES 1.008** 1.012** 0.994** 1.004**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
NO. OF NON-PAT. REF. 1.025** 1.023** 1.032** 1.012**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
SHARE OF X REFERENCES 1.063** 1.197** 0.778** 1.067**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.012)
SHARE OF Y REFERENCES 1.051** 1.110** 0.875** 1.037**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.013)
SHARE OF D REFERENCES 0.982** 0.915** 1.252** 0.956**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.016) (0.015)
Citation Measures
NUMBER OF CITATIONS 1.011** 0.999** 1.062** 1.021**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002)
SHARE OF X CITATIONS 1.027** 1.024** 1.008 1.012
(0.004) (0.004) (0.012) (0.016)
SHARE OF Y CITATIONS 1.024** 1.010* 1.026 1.053*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.015) (0.022)
SHARE OF D CITATIONS 1.024** 0.946** 1.368** 1.069**
(0.006) (0.005) (0.026) (0.025)
Observations 215,259 215,259 215,259 215,259
Exits 200,040 132,697 58,485 8,858
Log Likelihood -119,239.41 -72,997.354 -140,040.07 -28,890.64
LR χ2(63) 45,074.63 57,563.44 11,869.45 2,446.98
Table 6: Estimation results from an accelerated failure time model using a log-logistic
specification. Estimates from a pooled and a competing risk specification are displayed.
Estimated coefficients are exponentiated. The estimation includes year dummies and
dummy variables for 30 technological fields.
**: 1% significant, *: 5% significant. Standard errors in parentheses.
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